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Dear Reader: 
In the wake of the Great Recession, states have to do more with less—so every 
dollar counts. Lawmakers are looking to get their fiscal houses in order, deliver 
critical services more effectively and at a lower cost, and invest where the proven 
returns are greatest, in areas that will generate dividends over the short and long 
term. The Pew Center on the States works on a range of important issues to help 
them do just that.
States spend billions of dollars annually on tax incentives for economic 
development, offering businesses credits, exemptions, and deductions to locate, 
hire, expand and invest within their borders. But this report, Evidence Counts, 
finds that half the states have not taken basic steps to produce and connect 
policy makers with good evidence of whether these tools deliver a strong return 
on taxpayer dollars. This knowledge gap is particularly worrisome at a time of 
tight budgets and sluggish economic growth. If policy makers do not base their 
decisions about tax incentives on good information, they could be spending scarce 
resources unwisely. On the other hand, if they do not use these incentives or use 
them well, they could be missing out on opportunities to create jobs and attract 
new businesses. 
This report builds on Pew’s efforts to provide decision-makers with important 
information about both the fiscal challenges they face and data-driven policy 
options. We hope this work will inform and guide state leaders as they chart a 
path toward recovery today and sustainability tomorrow. 
Sincerely,
 
Susan Urahn 
Managing Director, Pew Center on the States
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Executive Summary
In their quest to strengthen their 
economies, particularly in the wake of 
the Great Recession, states continue to 
rely heavily on tax incentives, including 
credits, exemptions, and deductions, 
to encourage businesses to locate, hire, 
expand, and invest within their borders. 
Yet half the states have not taken basic 
steps to produce and connect policy 
makers with good evidence of whether 
these tools deliver a strong return on 
taxpayer dollars. 
Research by the Pew Center on the States 
concludes 13 states are leading the way in 
generating much-needed answers about 
tax incentives’ effectiveness. Twelve states 
have mixed results. The other 25 states, 
along with Washington, D.C., are trailing 
behind. 
Although no one knows the total, 
policy makers spend billions of dollars 
annually on tax incentives for economic 
development, and use of these investments 
appears to have grown substantially since 
the 1970s. Today, every state has at least 
one tax incentive program, and most have 
at least several. Frequently, they are used 
as part of a bidding war between states 
over firms seeking to relocate or expand. 
If one state offers a tax credit, others often 
feel compelled to match it or risk being left 
behind.
But no state regularly and rigorously tests 
whether those investments are working 
and ensures lawmakers consider this 
information when deciding whether to 
use them, how much to spend, and who 
should get them. Often, states that have 
conducted rigorous evaluations of some 
incentives virtually ignore others or assess 
them infrequently. Other states regularly 
examine these investments, but not 
thoroughly enough.
The good news is that a wealth of 
promising approaches exists for lawmakers 
to emulate. 
Evaluations are most valuable when 
they improve policy choices. Some 
states are leaders because of the scope of 
their assessments: They have reviewed 
all major tax incentives and have taken 
steps to integrate the results into policy 
and budget deliberations. Oregon, for 
example, gives its incentives expiration 
dates, or “sunsets,” which force lawmakers 
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Leading the way Mixed results Trailing behind
13 12 26
States meeting both 
criteria for scope of 
evaluation and/or both 
criteria for quality of
evaluation.
States meeting only 
one of the criteria for 
scope and/or quality of 
evaluation.
States not meeting 
any of the criteria for 
scope or quality of 
evaluation.
OVERALL: 50-STATE RATINGS
Overall: How are states doing?
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ExECutivE Summary
to examine them periodically. Arizona, 
Iowa, and Washington also are trying to 
ensure their evaluations become part of 
the policy-making process.  
Other states have distinguished 
themselves through the quality of their 
analysis. In Connecticut, a study of 
the Job Creation Tax Credit provided 
evidence that the investment had 
benefited the state, and in Wisconsin, 
policy makers scaled back the state’s 
film tax credit after an evaluation found 
it to be highly ineffective. The best 
evaluations also highlight opportunities 
for improvement. Louisiana’s economic 
development agency discovered that 
one tax incentive it previously credited 
with creating more than 9,000 jobs had 
produced a third of that number. By 
taking a closer look, the agency identified 
a number of ways the incentive could 
be strengthened, many of which were 
adopted by state officials. Minnesota 
changed a particular incentive when a 
more thorough evaluation concluded it 
cost five times as much per job as the 
state previously believed.
Pew reviewed nearly 600 documents and 
interviewed more than 175 government 
officials and experts to examine how—and 
how well—states gauge the effectiveness 
of their tax incentives, if they do so at 
all. We also sought to identify promising 
approaches to doing it right.
In assessing state practices, this study 
does not take a position on whether tax 
incentives for economic development are 
good or bad. Rather, we examined the 
effectiveness of each state’s evaluations, 
focusing on whether, and to what degree, 
they do the following:
1. Inform policy choices
2. Include all major tax incentives
3. Measure economic impact
4. Draw clear conclusions
Tax incentives cost billions of dollars every 
year, and states rely heavily on them to 
promote economic development. Policy 
makers should know whether these tools 
deliver a strong return on investment. 
Regular, rigorous, and comprehensive 
evaluations of tax incentives are critical to 
their ability to do so.
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Inform policy
choices
What states can do:
Effective
evaluations: A leading example:
Build evaluation of 
incentives into policy and 
budget deliberations to 
ensure lawmakers use 
the results.
Under a new Oregon law, tax credits expire every 
six years unless lawmakers extend them. During 
budget deliberations in 2011, legislative leaders 
set a spending cap on expiring incentives, 
driving policy makers to rely on evaluations to 
make tough choices about which incentives 
should continue, why, and in what form.
Measure
economic
impact
Ask and answer the right 
questions using good 
data and analysis.
In calculating the number of jobs a tax incentive 
was creating, Louisiana’s economic 
development agency took into account that 
some businesses receiving the incentives 
competed with other businesses in the state. 
The agency concluded that some newly created 
jobs merely displaced existing positions.
Draw clear
conclusions
Determine whether tax 
incentives are achieving 
the state’s goals.
In 2010, Connecticut’s economic development 
agency assessed the state’s major tax credits, 
using sophisticated analysis techniques. The 
agency concluded that although some 
incentives were not meeting the state’s goals, 
others were benecial and cost-effective.
Include all major
tax incentives
Establish a strategic and 
ongoing schedule to 
review all tax incentives 
for economic 
development.
In 2007, Washington began a 10-year process 
to review every tax incentive it offers. Today, 
nonpartisan analysts work with a citizen 
commission each year to analyze a particular 
group of incentives and make 
recommendations on whether and how they 
should change. Lawmakers review the 
recommendations at hearings.
Four criteria for effective evaluation
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the Problem—and Why it matters
In 2011, as they pondered how to close 
a budget gap of more than $200 million, 
New Mexico lawmakers turned their 
attention to the state’s tax credit for movie 
and television productions. Since the 
credit’s creation in 2002, the cost had 
risen to more than $60 million a year.1 
Lawmakers debated whether it was a 
ripe target to help balance the budget or 
whether movie and television productions 
generated enough economic activity to 
make up for the lost tax revenue. Each side 
had data to back up its view: Studies of 
the credit had produced wildly divergent 
answers.
A 2008 study for the legislature, written by 
New Mexico State University researchers, 
found that the state’s investment generated 
just 14 cents per dollar in new revenue. 
From this perspective, New Mexico was 
losing out on tens of millions of dollars a 
year—money that could have been used 
to help balance the budget or for other 
priorities.2
But a 2009 study produced by Ernst & 
Young for the State Film Office found that 
every dollar spent on the film tax credit 
generated 94 cents in new state revenue. 
It indicated that New Mexico was reaping 
substantial economic benefits for a credit 
that nearly paid for itself.3
In the end, the state capped the program 
at $50 million a year. The conflicting 
studies, though, highlighted the need 
for good data. With one dissenting vote, 
lawmakers passed a bill to require film 
production companies to submit more 
detailed information on their spending 
and Gov. Susana Martinez (R) signed it 
into law. Now, the New Mexico Economic 
Development Department will be required 
to use the newly collected data to report 
on the credit’s economic effectiveness. 
Although the budget debate on the tax 
credit was contentious, the bill requiring 
this new evaluation had broad support 
from the film industry and from the 
credit’s critics. “We need a reliable study,” 
said state Sen. Tim Keller (D), sponsor of 
the bill.4
Like New Mexico, most states are trying 
to rebuild their budgets after having 
closed budget gaps totaling more than 
$500 billion in the past five years, and 
many have not regained the private-sector 
jobs lost during the Great Recession.5 
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State policy makers always are seeking to 
grow their economies, but are under even 
greater pressure to do so.  
Tax incentives are a leading tool they 
employ. Every year, states offer tax credits, 
exemptions, and deductions to encourage 
businesses to create jobs and invest in 
the local economy. Every state has at 
least one tax incentive program and most 
have at least several. Incentives target 
businesses in a particular industry, such as 
manufacturing or movie production, those 
in geographic areas needing development, 
or those that meet certain criteria, such as 
hiring new workers. Frequently, incentives 
are used as part of a bidding war between 
states over firms seeking to relocate or 
expand. If one state offers an incentive, its 
competitors often feel compelled to match 
it or risk being left behind. “I would love 
to compete just on the basis of quality 
of life and other attributes than dollars,” 
says Alan Levin, director of the Delaware 
Economic Development Office. “But that 
is not the way the game is played today, so 
you have to bring the tools that everyone 
else has or you lose.”6
Deciding whether to make these 
investments, how much to spend, and 
which businesses should receive them 
involves policy choices with significant 
implications. When states offer economic 
development tax incentives, they have 
less money to spend on education, 
transportation, health care, and other 
critical services. Conversely, if states do not 
use incentives or use them well, they may 
be forgoing opportunities to create jobs 
and attract new businesses, among other 
benefits. 
Thus, it is particularly important that 
policy makers know if these investments 
are cost-effective. But most do not have the 
data to make that determination. 
The stakes are high. Because the numbers 
are not regularly and reliably reported, 
the exact cost of states’ tax incentives is 
unknown. Some states do not estimate 
or publish the costs, and among those 
that do, differences in methodology 
prevent coming up with a reliable total. 
However, that number is certainly in the 
billions of dollars. A recent study looked 
at a select set of major tax incentives, 
including ones from nearly every state, 
and found the combined cost exceeded 
$9 billion.7 Considering all tax incentives 
for economic development, the 50-state 
total likely is significantly higher. In 
addition, their use appears to have 
Deciding whether to make 
these investments, how much 
to spend, and which businesses 
should receive them involves 
policy choices with significant 
implications.
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thE ProblEm—and Why it mattErS
grown substantially since the 1970s.8 For 
example, in 2000 four states had film tax 
incentive programs, totaling $3 million. In 
2011, 37 had such programs, providing 
$1.3 billion.9 
The amount of money at stake in a state 
can be significant. “For over a billion 
dollars’ worth of business tax breaks [in 
Massachusetts], there are no measures 
of success,” says Suzanne Bump (D), the 
state’s auditor. “No one is determining 
whether it’s benefiting the intended 
recipients or the public. It shows the 
real need for this kind of analysis.”10 
In Georgia, tax credits for economic 
development are expected to cost the 
state more than $100 million in fiscal year 
2012.11 A tax reform panel concluded last 
year that although the state offers more 
than 30 credits to businesses, “there is 
little research that has evaluated the value 
of economic development tax credits in 
general and in Georgia in particular.”12
California does not publish high-quality 
evaluations of a tax credit for research 
and development that costs more than $1 
billion annually.13 Sixteen states (Alabama, 
Alaska, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming) and the 
District of Columbia did not publish 
a document between 2007 and 2011 
that evaluated the effectiveness of a tax 
incentive.14
States have found that a high-quality 
evaluation can yield a dramatically 
different result than a less thorough 
one. For example, in Minnesota, the 
Department of Employment and 
Economic Development estimated that 
each job created through the state’s Job 
Opportunity Building Zones (JOBZ) 
program cost about $5,000. After a 
more rigorous evaluation, the Legislative 
Auditor’s office calculated a per-job cost of 
between $26,900 and $30,800.15 Agency 
officials added rules designed to prevent 
companies from claiming JOBZ benefits 
if they would have located in the state 
without the incentives.
In Louisiana, the state economic 
development department attributed more 
than 9,000 new jobs to its Enterprise Zone 
program, but a few months later a more 
rigorous evaluation by the agency found 
the program had produced only 3,000 net 
new jobs.16 The agency also found that 
when a new owner bought a firm, the rules 
may have allowed the new owner to count 
existing employees toward the program’s 
job-creation requirements. Decision 
makers changed the rules to keep this from 
happening.
In both cases, the evaluations 
informed policy choices, with program 
improvements resulting from the findings. 
In many states, evaluation takes place for 
only some economic development tax 
incentives. Massachusetts, Michigan, New 
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Mexico, and Wisconsin have studied their 
film tax credits in recent years but have 
not reviewed other types of incentives in 
the same detail. Other states review all 
their economic development tax incentives 
but with minimal rigor. In Louisiana, the 
Department of Revenue is required to 
report whether each credit, exemption, or 
deduction has achieved its purpose and 
whether it was the most fiscally efficient 
means to reach that goal. In its 2011-
12 report, the agency concluded that 
the purpose of dozens of incentives was 
“achieved in a fiscally effective manner,” 
but offered no information on their 
economic results.17
Less-rigorous estimates of economic 
impact also can lead to vague or 
inconclusive findings. In California, 
companies claiming tax breaks under the 
state’s Enterprise Zone program reported 
hiring nearly 37,000 new employees in 
2008. But the state’s Legislative Analyst’s 
Office cast doubt on whether the program 
was creating jobs at all, although it 
could not provide a better estimate.18 
In 2007, Pennsylvania’s Department of 
Community and Economic Development 
said the state’s Keystone Opportunity Zone 
program had created nearly 64,000 jobs 
since 1999. One year later, the agency 
reduced its estimate to less than 35,000. 
The next year, a legislative committee 
review concluded that neither number 
was reliable and made suggestions for 
improving how data were collected and 
analyzed.19
In many cases, not only are states not 
getting reliable answers, they are not even 
asking questions about the effectiveness 
of their tax incentives. Because they are 
generally not considered part of the state 
budget, these incentives often avoid 
scrutiny from elected officials. 
In Ohio, the state Chamber of Commerce 
and eight regional chambers issued a 
December 2010 report pointing out that 
tax credits, deductions, and exemptions 
“can be a tremendous economic tool.” 
However, the report continued, “Ohio has 
no formal policies in place to regularly 
determine what value its tax expenditures 
are producing for citizens.” It called for 
improving the scope and depth of the 
state’s evaluation efforts, including “a full 
assessment of both the cost and economic 
benefit of each tax expenditure.”20
The good news is that policy makers in 
Ohio and many other states are beginning 
to scrutinize tax incentives more carefully. 
“I want the answers to all of them,” said 
state Rep. David Dank (R), who co-chaired 
an Oklahoma task force on tax incentives 
in 2011. “What are they doing? How do 
the benefits match up to the cost to the 
taxpayers?”21
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To determine whether policy makers are 
getting the information to understand 
whether tax incentives are delivering 
a strong return on investment, Pew 
reviewed nearly 600 documents from 
state agencies and legislative committees 
and interviewed more than 175 policy 
makers, agency officials, and experts. 
We also received guidance and input on 
this research from several independent 
external advisers.
We narrowed that batch of documents to 
slightly fewer than 300 by focusing on 
those that were published or sponsored 
by a state agency or legislative committee 
between 2007 and 2011 and included 
data or analysis on the cost or benefit of 
tax incentives for economic development.
Next, we distinguished those that were 
actual evaluations. Documents had to 
attempt to determine the effectiveness 
of an incentive rather than just report 
numbers, and also consider the overall 
economic impact of the incentive, rather 
than just the results of a project or 
business receiving it. The 82 documents 
that met these standards formed the 
basis of our assessment. (More detail 
on the methodology is available in 
Appendix B. Descriptions of other 
types of state documents related to tax 
incentives can be found in Appendix C.)
In assessing the 50 states and Washington, 
D.C., Pew examined both the scope and 
quality of states’ evaluations. 
Scope. We asked whether the state 
1) assesses all its major incentives for 
economic development, and 2) seeks 
to ensure that the results inform policy 
makers’ deliberations. The state’s rating 
on scope is based both on the evaluations 
it conducted during the study period 
and on interviews with executive and 
legislative officials. States that met these 
criteria are leading the way in this area. 
States that met the first criterion but not 
the second have mixed results, and states 
that met neither are trailing behind (see 
table on page 10).
Quality. Pew looked at whether each 
evaluation 1) thoroughly examines 
the tax incentive’s impact on the state’s 
economy, and 2) draws clear conclusions 
about whether it is achieving the state’s 
goals and how it might be improved. 
how are States doing?
PEw cEntEr on thE statEs10
hoW arE StatES doing?
States’ ratings on quality are based on 
their single best evaluations. That enabled 
us to identify states that have performed 
quality evaluations at least once, even 
if they have not done so for all tax 
incentives. As with scope, states leading 
the way met both criteria. Those with 
mixed results met just one or the other, 
and those trailing behind met neither  
(see table below).
State-by-state ratings for scope can be 
found on page 13. State-by-state ratings 
for quality can be found on page 20. A list 
of the documents used to determine states’ 
ratings can be found in Appendix C.
The two ratings are combined for an 
overall rating. A state that is leading the 
way on either scope or quality is leading 
the way overall. States that met at least one 
of the four criteria but are not leading the 
way in scope or quality have mixed results 
overall. States that did not meet any of the 
four criteria are trailing behind. 
This analysis shows that although some 
states are doing a better job than others, 
no state has a complete picture of what its 
tax incentives are achieving. For instance, 
Minnesota has performed high-quality 
evaluations, but only for a small number 
of incentives. Arizona reviews most of 
Inform
policy
choices
Include
all tax
incentivesSCOPE RATING
Trailing behind
Mixed results
Leading the way
The two ratings are combined for an overall rating. A state that is leading the way on 
either scope or quality is leading the way overall. States that met at least one of the four 
criteria but are not leading the way in scope or quality have mixed results overall. States 
that did not meet any of the four criteria are trailing behind. 
Overall Rating
Measure
economic
impact
Draw
clear
conclusionsQUALITY RATING
Trailing behind
Mixed results
Mixed results
Leading the way
Rating the states
Rating the
scope of evaluation
Rating the
quality of evaluation
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Leading the way Mixed results Trailing behind
13 12 26
States meeting both 
criteria for scope of 
evaluation and/or both 
criteria for quality of
evaluation.
States meeting only 
one of the criteria for 
scope and/or quality of 
evaluation.
States not meeting 
any of the criteria for 
scope or quality of 
evaluation.
OVERALL: 50-STATE RATINGS
Overall: How are states doing?
Evidence Counts: Evaluating State Tax Incentives for Jobs and Growth
PEw cEntEr on thE statEs12
hoW arE StatES doing?
its incentives, but without thoroughly 
measuring their economic impact. Oregon 
is the only state that has performed at 
least some high-quality evaluations and 
instituted legislative review of all its major 
incentives. However, Oregon has not linked 
these two elements—that is, the evaluations 
that lawmakers rely on are not always 
rigorous. 
A lower rating in this study does not 
necessarily mean that the state’s tax 
incentives are ineffective. Conversely, a 
higher rating does not mean that the state’s 
policy makers are making sound, evidence-
based decisions on incentives. States were 
assessed on how well they evaluate their 
incentives, not on the merits or effectiveness 
of the incentives themselves.
SCOPE OF EVALUATIONS:
informing Policy 
choices
What states can do: Build evaluation 
of incentives into policy and budget 
deliberations to ensure lawmakers 
use the results. 
Unless policy makers act on the findings, 
evidence of how well tax incentives are 
working might not help ensure a strong 
return on the investments. 
One challenge states face in translating 
evidence into policy is that lawmakers in 
most states do not regularly review tax 
incentives. “In an operating and capital 
budget, we review everything every year. 
Maybe not as carefully as we should, but we 
actually have to take a vote on everything,” 
says Sen. Liz Krueger (D), ranking member 
of the New York Senate Finance Committee. 
On the other hand, for tax incentives, 
Krueger notes, “once it hits the books, it 
is quite possible no one ever looks at it 
again.”22
Only four states—Arizona, Iowa, Oregon, 
and Washington—have integrated 
evaluation of their major incentives into 
the policy process, ensuring that those 
investments are regularly reviewed. They 
offer valuable examples for other states to 
learn from.
In Oregon, a 2009 law established 
expiration dates of six years for most tax 
credits. The sunsets were staggered so 
that credits with similar goals would end 
at the same time. Those for economic 
development will expire together, as 
will incentives that serve goals such as 
improving education. That allows decision 
makers to compare the results of similar 
programs. “Tax credits had been in a 
protected class for as long as I have any 
memory,” says Sen. Ginny Burdick (D), 
co-chair of the legislature’s new Joint 
Committee on Tax Credits. “This puts tax 
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Leading the way Mixed results Trailing behind
4 12 35
States that informed 
policy choices with 
reviews of all major 
tax incentives.
States that reviewed 
all major tax 
incentives, but fell 
short in using the 
data to inform policy 
choices.
States that did not 
review all major tax 
incentives or use 
data to inform 
policy choices.
SCOPE: 50-STATE RATINGS
Scope: How are states doing?
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credits on the same playing field as other 
expenditures.”23
In 2011, extending all expiring tax credits 
would have cost about $40 million. But 
legislative leaders told the Joint Committee 
they had only $10 million to work with. 
The combination of this spending cap and 
the sunsets forced them to make tough 
decisions. The committee held hearings on 
the credits and solicited testimony from 
state agencies, businesses receiving the 
incentives, and the public. “Once we went 
under the hood of these tax credits, there 
were surprises in every one,” says Rep. 
Jules Bailey (D), one of the committee co-
chairs.24
In the end, lawmakers allowed several 
incentives to expire, but the bulk of the 
cost savings came from significantly 
redesigning a tax credit intended to 
encourage alternative-energy production 
and conservation that had grown to be 
far more expensive than intended. Other 
credits were extended for another six 
years. In a legislature nearly evenly divided 
between Republicans and Democrats, there 
were only three dissenting votes on the bill, 
which was signed into law by Gov. John 
Kitzhaber (D).25 
Oregon lawmakers are well positioned 
to regularly scrutinize tax incentives. But 
although the sunset dates are written into 
law, there is no policy to ensure expiring 
incentives receive in-depth evaluation. 
Still, lawmakers think creating a budget 
for tax incentives and a legislative 
committee to study them is a step in the 
right direction. “Our whole constitutional 
duty as a legislature is to balance the 
budget,” says Representative Vicki Berger 
(R), a committee co-chair. “If these are 
expenditures, they need to be part of the 
budget process. That’s the purpose of this 
committee.”26
Since 2006, Washington State has had a 
strategy for reviewing tax incentives that 
combines citizen input, expert analysis 
from the legislative auditor, and annual 
hearings by legislative leaders. 
1. A Citizen Commission, appointed 
by the governor and the majority and 
minority leaders from the Senate and 
House, establishes a schedule to ensure 
that each tax expenditure is reviewed at 
least once in a 10-year period.
2. The nonpartisan staff from the 
Joint Legislative Audit and Review 
Committee (JLARC) evaluates whether 
the tax preference’s public policy 
objective is being met and provides 
recommendations to continue, modify, 
or terminate the incentives.
3. JLARC submits the report to the 
Citizen Commission along with 
comments from the Department of 
Revenue and the Office of Financial 
Management.
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4. The commission holds a public 
hearing on JLARC’s report and provides 
its own consensus-based comments 
and recommendations.
5. The legislative fiscal committees 
hold a joint hearing on the report.
“These are not easy analyses to do,” says 
former state auditor Ruta Fanning. “Having 
staff that work on these evaluations every 
year helps. Their knowledge of the tax 
code and experience doing these kinds of 
evaluations can help them learn from year 
to year in order to make improvements.” 
Fanning notes that over the years, JLARC’s 
analysts have learned how to identify 
the often-obscure original purpose of 
the incentives. They also have become 
adept at comparing results from other 
states. Recently, policy makers granted the 
Citizen Commission flexibility to schedule 
reviews based on criteria such as type of 
industry or policy focus, rather than just 
the year of enactment. This enables JLARC 
to compare the effectiveness of incentives 
with similar purposes at the same time.29 
State Rep. Gary Alexander (R) says JLARC 
analysts produce recommendations “from 
an unbiased standpoint, and that is very 
helpful when I consider whether to pursue 
their recommendations or not.”30 
Some commission members say there 
should be more pressure on legislators to 
act on the panel’s recommendations. “It is 
a great process in terms of depoliticizing 
OrEgON’S STrATEgIC 
INVESTmENT PrOgrAm
oregon’s strategic investment 
Program (siP) is intended to 
encourage companies to make large 
capital investments.
the application process includes a 
public hearing, a written agreement 
with the county where the investment 
will be made, and final approval from 
the oregon business development 
commission. approved projects 
receive a 15-year partial property 
tax exemption. for example, a 
qualified company that made a $300 
million investment in new plants or 
equipment would pay taxes on just 
$100 million in the first year, saving 
more than $3 million.27
in the 2011-13 biennium, siP is 
expected to reduce local property tax 
revenue by $191 million.28 to offset 
this, companies must pay service fees 
to the county and, if applicable, the 
city or other service providers such as 
fire districts. they must also agree to 
hire local workers where practicable. 
the state budget is affected because 
the state must replace the revenue 
lost to school districts. however, as 
a property tax exemption, siP was 
not included in the 2009 law that 
established sunsets for tax credits.
since the incentive was created 
in 1993, the primary beneficiary 
has been semiconductor chip 
manufacturer intel.
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it, it is a great process in terms of 
providing really high-quality analysis 
and information, it is a great process in 
terms of involving public stakeholders 
and getting their views on the table, 
but it stops at that point,” says William 
Longbrake, a member of the commission 
since its inception. “There is nothing that 
requires the legislature to do anything 
other than receive the report and hold 
one hearing on it.”31  The commission 
recently recommended that the legislature 
be more consistent in setting sunsets on 
tax incentives to ensure action is taken 
more often.
Arizona and Iowa have not gone as far as 
Oregon and Washington, but lawmakers 
in both states have committed to reviewing 
all major tax incentives every five years.  
Since 2002, Arizona’s joint Legislative 
Income Tax Credit Review Committee 
has met once a year to consider corporate 
and personal income tax credits. By 
law, all existing credits and any new 
credits the legislature creates must come 
before the committee every five years. 
Legislative staff members provide the 
committee with information on each 
credit: its purpose, its fiscal impact, 
and possible performance measures to 
determine whether it is working. With 
the staff report in hand, the committee 
holds a hearing on the credits up for 
review, taking testimony from the 
public. Then the panel makes formal 
recommendations to the full legislature. 
“It’s just a good idea to review them 
periodically,” says Rep. J.D. Mesnard (R), 
co-chair of the committee, “and make 
sure they’re worth it.”32
Iowa’s Legislative Tax Expenditure 
Committee held its first meeting in 
November 2011. Like Arizona, it has 
a schedule for reviewing tax incentives 
on a five-year cycle. Iowa’s committee is 
required by law to report on the return 
on investment the state is getting from 
the incentive programs, but has not 
yet determined how it will make those 
calculations. It has the power to offer 
recommendations, but, unlike Arizona, 
it is not required to and has not yet done 
so. As in Arizona, it may end up meeting 
one day a year. “The more time legislators 
spend understanding how these things 
work, the better,” says state Sen. Joe 
Bolkcom (D), co-chair of the committee. 
“If we know how they work, we’ll make 
better decisions.”33
What Iowa has that Arizona does not is 
a history of producing rigorous analyses 
of tax incentives, according to Pew’s 
research. If the new process includes 
the high-quality assessments the Iowa 
Department of Revenue is known for, Iowa 
could become a model for other states. 
Recently, the department published new 
evaluations on three of the tax credits that 
came before the legislative committee at 
its first meeting. It will be up to the state’s 
elected officials to decide what to do with 
the findings. 
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SCOPE OF EVALUATIONS:
including all Major 
tax incentives
What states can do: Establish a strategic 
and ongoing schedule to review all tax 
incentives for economic development.
Sixteen states either evaluated all of 
their major tax incentives for economic 
development between 2007 and 2011 
or have taken steps toward doing so, 
according to Pew’s analysis. (Including all 
incentives requires significant resources, 
so some states have established criteria to 
determine which are “major”—i.e., should 
receive priority consideration. For example, 
although all incentives receive reviews, 
Washington’s Joint Legislative Audit and 
Review Committee conducts deeper 
evaluations of those that cost more than 
$10 million over two years.)
By looking at all incentives, states can 
compare them to each other and determine 
which are the most effective. They can also 
decide which are duplicative and which 
complement one another.
Of the nine states that have scheduled 
recurrent reviews, Arkansas, California, and 
Nebraska perform these annually. Delaware’s 
occur every two years, and Connecticut 
recently initiated a once-every-three-years 
assessment. Arizona, Iowa, Oregon, and 
Washington have set a revolving schedule 
OkLAhOmA’S 
QUALITy JObS 
PrOgrAm
although this report focuses just 
on incentives through states’ tax 
systems, businesses are offered 
other economic development 
benefits. for example, oklahoma’s 
largest economic development 
incentive is its Quality Jobs 
program, which offers quarterly cash 
payments to companies locating or 
expanding in the state based on a 
simple cost-benefit analysis.
to qualify, companies must be 
manufacturers or in certain service 
sectors and must generally create 
new jobs with a total payroll of $2.5 
million or more (lower thresholds 
apply in certain cases). they must 
also meet wage and health-care 
coverage requirements.
hundreds of companies benefit 
from Quality Jobs annually, and the 
oklahoma tax commission reports 
recipients’ names and the amounts 
of their payments. in fiscal year 
2011, payments totaled more than 
$60 million; among those receiving 
multimillion-dollar payments were 
oil and natural gas companies 
sandridge, chesapeake, and 
conocoPhillips, computer 
manufacturer dell, aerospace 
manufacturer spirit aerosystems, 
and the owners of the national 
basketball association’s oklahoma 
city thunder. 34
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ranging from five to 10 years.35 Any 
decision about frequency comes with 
trade-offs between resources, timeliness, 
and depth of the analysis. “If we tried to do 
a complete and thorough review of all the 
tax rules and incentives and preferences 
in one year or two, it would be an 
overwhelming task,” says Rep. Alexander, 
of Washington State.36 
In 2010, the Connecticut Department of 
Economic and Community Development 
issued the first of the state’s triennial 
assessments, evaluating economic impact 
data as far back as 1995. This analysis 
allows policy makers to identify whether 
programs are growing or shrinking, and 
whether they are becoming more or less 
effective over time.37
In 2010, Missouri Gov. Jay Nixon 
(D) created a Tax Credit Review 
Commission made up of 27 business, 
community, and legislative leaders. Its 
charge was “a critical analysis to ensure 
taxpayers receive the greatest possible 
return on investment from tax credit 
programs and that those programs are 
used efficiently and effectively.”38 The 
commission recommended eliminating 
or not reauthorizing 28 tax credits 
and recommended improvements to 
30 other programs to increase their 
return on investment. They also made 
recommendations on how to make 
regular review part of the policy-making 
process.39 (Lawmakers have since spent 
months debating how to overhaul the 
state’s tax credits, but they have not yet 
made the big changes the commission 
envisioned.)
Between 2007 and 2009, the Ohio 
Department of Development worked 
with a task force to conduct a detailed 
examination of the state’s economic 
development incentives. The 
comprehensive nature of the study 
enabled the group to identify ways to 
streamline or consolidate programs—
opportunities they could not have 
identified studying one incentive at 
a time. The task force also proposed 
increasing the transparency of transactions 
and decisions across a range of 
incentives.40 Lawmakers enacted many 
of the changes the report proposed. “I’d 
describe this experience as taking a ship 
into dry dock and knocking the barnacles 
off,” says Steve Schoeny, director of the 
department’s strategic business investment 
division at the time.41
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QUALITy OF EVALUATIONS:
Measuring 
Economic impact
What states can do: Ask and answer 
the right questions using good data 
and analysis. 
When it comes to determining whether 
tax incentives are driving economic 
development, states have to ask the right 
questions to get the right answers. The 
states that have thoroughly measured the 
impact of at least some incentives tend 
to focus on a handful of key questions 
that are relevant when evaluating any 
government investment with an economic 
development purpose. They include:
n Cause and effect: To what extent 
did tax incentives change businesses’ 
decisions, and how much did they 
reward what would have happened 
anyway?
n Winners and losers: To what 
extent did the incentive benefit some 
businesses or individuals at the 
expense of others?
n Unintended beneficiaries: How 
much of the benefit of the incentive 
flowed across state borders?
n Timing: When will the costs and 
benefits of the incentive occur, and 
how long will they last?
n Economics of budget trade-offs: 
What were the adverse economic 
impacts of the tax increases or 
spending cuts made to fund the 
incentive? Do the benefits of the 
incentive outweigh those impacts?
n Indirect impacts: To what extent 
do the investments of companies 
receiving incentives filter into the 
broader economy, causing further 
economic gains?
cause and effect
A core problem vexing states is that it is 
difficult to determine what would have 
happened but for the tax incentives. In 
some cases, they might cause companies 
to create jobs or increase investment, but 
they might just be offering public dollars 
to reward businesses for what they would 
have done anyway.
There is no simple way to isolate the 
impact of tax incentives, but a number of 
states use creative approaches to doing so.
To understand the impact of a tax credit 
designed to encourage businesses to 
conduct research, the Iowa Department 
of Revenue compared research spending, 
the number of patents granted, and the 
number of Ph.D. scientists and engineers 
between states, including those with and 
without such credits.42 The report found 
that the credits did not appear to increase 
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the level of research activities in the state, 
relative to other states. 
In 2011, consultants to the Oregon 
Department of Energy set out to determine 
the likelihood that the state’s Business 
Energy Tax Credit was encouraging energy 
projects that would not otherwise have 
gone forward. The consultants examined 
what return on investment would make 
various types of energy projects, such 
as solar and wind farms, worthwhile for 
private investors. Then they constructed 
financial models for representative 
companies. Using the models, they 
described the kinds of projects for 
which the incentive would be a deciding 
factor—for instance, small wind farms 
versus large ones. They proposed the state 
use these findings to focus resources on 
projects where the credit would make a 
difference.43
Minnesota’s legislative auditor relied 
on academic research to estimate that 
79 percent of the jobs reported from 
recipients of Job Opportunity Building 
Zones would have been created without 
the incentives.44 In response, the state 
Department of Employment and Economic 
Development began requiring that, before 
receiving the incentives, businesses certify 
they would not have located or expanded 
in Minnesota without the program.45
hAwAII’S FILm 
TAx CrEdIT
The Descendants was filmed on 
location in hawaii. like nearly 
40 other states, hawaii has a tax 
credit to encourage movies to be 
made there. in the case of The 
Descendants, this meant that for 
every qualified dollar ad hominem 
Productions and fox searchlight 
Pictures spent while filming in the 
state, their tax liability was reduced 
by 15 to 20 cents (depending on 
the island). Qualified expenses 
included equipment, travel, and 
the wages of any cast and crew 
members while they worked in 
hawaii—from local extras to star 
george clooney. 
the amount of the credit often 
exceeds the production companies’ 
tax liability. (the state expects 
the investment to pay off through 
direct and indirect spending related 
to the filmmaking and through 
tourism generated by the movie, 
among other factors.) if a business 
is awarded a credit larger than its 
tax liability, it receives the surplus in 
the form of a refund. some states 
offer “transferable” credits—instead 
of providing a refund, they allow 
companies to sell surplus credits to 
others.46
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winners and losers
States try to design tax incentives that 
will grow the state economy rather than 
redistribute existing resources. They do 
not always succeed. When evaluating such 
incentives, relatively few states recognize 
that the benefits they bring to a firm, 
industry, or community could be offset by 
losses to others.
Displacement depends on many factors, 
including the type of business receiving 
the incentive and local market conditions. 
As a general rule, if a beneficiary will rely 
heavily on local consumers, its job growth 
will be offset by job losses at existing 
businesses. For example, a tax incentive 
may spur the opening of a restaurant, 
which hires new employees. But if local 
residents patronize this restaurant instead 
of existing ones, the latter could be forced 
to lay off workers. 
To get beyond local demand, tax 
incentives often target industries such as 
manufacturing and tourism that also serve 
national and international customers. 
But this is not a guarantee against 
displacement. An incentive might prompt 
the opening of a new meatpacking plant, 
driving up the price of local livestock. The 
new plant might be able to pay the higher 
prices whereas older plants without the 
incentive cannot. 
In 2010, Louisiana’s economic 
development agency attempted to 
determine whether its Enterprise Zone 
program was creating some jobs at the 
expense of others. The agency estimated 
that 90 percent of the Enterprise Zone 
jobs in the hotel, restaurant, retail, 
and health-care industries were merely 
replacing existing jobs.47 This estimate 
relied on academic literature that showed 
the market for these industries tends 
to be local.48 The report pointed out 
the tax incentive program might be less 
effective than those of neighboring states, 
such as Texas and Arkansas, which 
prohibit retailers from qualifying for their 
equivalent tax credits. So far, Louisiana 
lawmakers have not acted to put similar 
restrictions in place.
unintended beneficiaries
Given the connection between regional, 
national, and even international 
economies, it is not possible to ensure 
that all benefits from an economic 
development tax incentive will remain 
within a state. The extent to which the 
benefits leak out of the state can help 
determine its value. For example, a 
Missouri tax incentive may prompt a 
business to relocate to Kansas City, MO, 
creating 100 jobs. But state lawmakers 
might view the incentive less favorably 
if 90 of those new employees live in 
Kansas City, KS. New jobs might also be 
filled by people moving to the state to 
take them, rather than current residents 
who need work. 
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In Wisconsin, the Department of 
Commerce in 2009 pointed out the size 
of incentives awarded through the state’s 
film tax credit was based on the movie’s 
total spending, not just the money spent 
in Wisconsin. Seventy-three percent of 
the spending on Public Enemies, a movie 
starring Johnny Depp and Christian 
Bale, flowed out of state, largely because 
most of the workers on the film were not 
Wisconsin residents. In fact, the report 
noted, the tax credit was structured in 
such a way that the production companies 
benefited from hiring out-of-state labor. 
Wisconsin ended up reimbursing the 
companies for $4.6 million, even though 
the film generated only $5 million 
in spending in the state. The credits 
increased net economic activity there only 
temporarily by less than half a million 
dollars.49 Prompted by the report, the state 
scaled back the film tax credit, capping 
it at $500,000 per year. “We wanted to 
reform the program,” says Zach Brandon, 
who co-authored the report, adding that 
his goal was to “force it to create jobs 
in the State of Wisconsin that could be 
measured because we didn’t care about 
jobs in [Los Angeles].”50
In examining the economic impact of a 
tax credit designed to increase research 
and development, the Connecticut 
Department of Economic and Community 
Development took into account that 
the credit spurred companies to buy 
specialized durable equipment. Since 
that equipment was not produced in 
Connecticut, some benefits from the credit 
were flowing out of state.51
Missouri’s state auditor discovered in 
2007 that a credit intended to encourage 
local processing of Missouri agricultural 
commodities and products was, in two 
cases, providing incentives to out-of-
state production facilities. The audit 
recommended a change in law that would 
ensure greater in-state economic benefits.52 
Policy makers agreed, and they approved 
legislation clarifying that the program was 
open only to companies with facilities in 
the state.53
timing
Often the costs and benefits of tax 
incentives do not occur simultaneously. 
Without careful analysis, this can skew 
the results of evaluations. Some incentives 
provide benefits only after a company has 
met certain requirements; others provide 
incentives upfront, even though the 
economic benefits (jobs, for example) will 
not materialize until later.
Between 2010 and early 2012, for 
example, the New Jersey Economic 
Development Authority (NJEDA) awarded 
tax credits worth more than $900 million 
to owners and developers who agreed to 
make capital investments of at least $50 
million near urban transit hubs and retain 
or create new jobs.54 But most projects 
have not yet broken ground, and the 
state Department of the Treasury expects 
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COLLECTINg hIgh-QUALITy dATA
Access to high-quality data is essential for determining tax incentives’ return 
on investment. Often lawmakers play an integral role in ensuring that data are 
collected and made available.
One approach is to require businesses to provide data as a condition of getting 
the benefit. the Massachusetts department of revenue could identify the in-state 
impact of a film tax credit because production companies are required to distinguish 
between spending that benefits residents of other states—such as the salaries of 
actors and directors—and spending that boosts the local economy. (in contrast, 
when it comes to other types of incentives, Massachusetts generally has not required 
companies to provide as much information.) the department’s rigorous evaluations 
of the film tax credit are possible only because the legislature required detailed 
production company budgets to be reported, says Kazim ozyurt, director of the 
office of tax Policy analysis.55
Another approach is to create access for evaluators to mine existing information. 
assessing incentives often involves using tax data that are subject to restrictive 
confidentiality rules. lawmakers, though, can make exceptions. in north carolina, 
the general assembly authorized a research team from the university of north 
carolina’s carolina center for competitive Economies to access confidential tax data 
from the department of revenue and employment data from the department of 
labor. the researchers showed that in most recent years, companies receiving tax 
credits under the state’s largest incentive program were adding jobs more slowly than 
companies that had not received the incentives.56 “we signed our life away with the 
confidentiality agreements,” senior research director Jason Jolley says. “this is why 
the state study is so unique. we had data that is confidential that no one else had.”57
policy makers also can help ensure agencies are working together to collect and 
analyze comprehensive information. in 2005, iowa did not have reliable estimates 
of how much tax credits were going to cost the state and in what year the costs 
would impact the state budget. to address this problem, the legislature paid for a 
collaboration between the department of revenue and agencies that award credits, 
such as the state’s economic development department. the agencies created a 
tracking system that catalogues when agencies award tax credits and keeps tabs on 
whether companies have claimed the credits on their taxes yet (sometimes credits are 
awarded years before they are claimed).58 in 2011, when the department evaluated 
a tax credit designed to encourage business research, the tracking system helped it 
perform a more rigorous analysis.59
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companies to claim only around $9 
million through June 2014.60 When the 
projects are completed, the owners and 
developers will receive tax credits of up 
to 100 percent of the amount they spent, 
which they can apply to their corporate 
business tax bill over a 10-year period or 
transfer to other businesses.61 Although the 
cost of the credits will occur over 10 years, 
the NJEDA expects the benefits will last for 
at least 20 years.62
In Connecticut, businesses start 
receiving the Urban and Industrial Site 
Reinvestment Credit only after building or 
expanding a facility and creating jobs in 
the state for three years. For that reason, 
Connecticut’s Department of Economic 
and Community Development is careful to 
offset the benefits by the costs only in the 
last seven years of the 10-year program.63 
In Oregon, in 2011, consultants studied 
incentives for energy projects such as wind 
and solar farms. When they measured the 
effects of the projects on employment and 
the size of the state’s economy, they created 
separate calculations for impact in two 
phases of the projects: during construction 
and during operations. By dividing their 
calculations that way, they showed that 
projects will have different economic 
results when they are operating than when 
they are under construction. For example, 
they found that building a typical large-
scale wind energy project would create 
671 jobs per year during the construction 
phase, but operation and maintenance of 
the same project would sustain only 24 
jobs a year.64
Economics of budget 
trade-offs
Any revenue states forfeit by offering tax 
incentives must be offset by spending 
cuts or tax increases to keep their budgets 
balanced. Because both actions are a drag 
on growth, a tax incentive’s net economic 
impact is its positive benefits for the state 
minus the cost of the economic harm that 
can result from cutting spending or raising 
taxes. Most evaluations do not take this 
into account, but some of the best ones 
do.65
In analyzing the impact of the state’s 
film-industry tax incentives, the 
Massachusetts Department of Revenue 
estimated that they created 1,643 jobs 
for state residents in 2009. However, 
the agency also estimated that the 
spending cuts required to pay for the 
incentives would reduce employment 
by 1,421 jobs, meaning the incentive 
was responsible for 222 Massachusetts 
jobs. The incentives cost more than $70 
million that year, which means that each 
of those positions cost the state more 
than $300,000 in 2009.66 About a year 
later, another study concluded the credit 
cost more Massachusetts jobs in 2010 
than it created.67 The 2009 version of the 
report helped prompt a debate within the 
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administration of Gov. Deval Patrick (D) 
over whether the credits were providing 
a good return on investment.68 In 2010, 
he proposed capping the program at $50 
million a year, but the legislature rejected 
that idea.
When consultants for the Oregon 
Department of Energy reviewed the state’s 
Business Energy Tax Credit, they found 
that it would have increased wages by 
nearly $168 million in 2008. However, 
because redirecting the money used on the 
incentives to other government programs 
would have also increased wages, their 
estimate of the net wage growth from the 
tax credit was the difference between the 
two options: $17.5 million.69
indirect impacts
If a factory hires employees as a result 
of a tax incentive, the economic payoff 
may not stop there. Businesses that sell 
products to that factory could benefit 
and hire more workers. The new 
employees could spend their increased 
income locally, further multiplying the 
benefits. These indirect impacts are even 
more difficult to assess than the initial 
number of jobs created.
To measure these ripple effects, evaluators 
often use a methodology called economic 
impact analysis, usually relying on 
software packages such as REMI and 
IMPLAN. These models use complex 
equations to predict how the economy 
will react to different scenarios, enabling 
analysts to estimate, for example, the 
number of restaurant jobs that will result 
from an increase in manufacturing jobs in 
the same community.
Economic impact analysis can provide a 
wealth of important information. Some of 
the most effective evaluations identified in 
this study, including those in Connecticut 
and Missouri, use these models. In other 
cases, an economic impact analysis may 
convey an undeserved sense of rigor. Some 
evaluations that use REMI or IMPLAN do 
not take into account the budget trade-offs 
of incentives, or they simply assume that 
all economic benefits resulted from the 
incentives. 
A study of the New Jersey Urban 
Enterprise Zone used IMPLAN to 
estimate how the economy would benefit 
if the program worked as intended. 
Many studies stop there and assume 
the projected results occurred—giving 
the incentive automatic credit. In New 
Jersey, however, researchers compared 
the expected results to what was actually 
happening and found the program was 
falling short. IMPLAN estimated, for 
example, that if the program was working 
as designed, the sales tax exemption 
would have created more than 800 jobs, 
but the businesses receiving the exemption 
reported a loss of more than 2,000 jobs, 
making it unlikely the program was having 
the desired effect.70
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QUALITy OF EVALUATIONS:
drawing clear 
conclusions
What states can do: Determine 
whether tax incentives are achieving 
the state’s goals.
The best evaluations of tax incentives 
for economic development draw clear 
conclusions, especially about whether the 
investment is meeting the state’s goals.
Some states are making efforts to define 
more clearly the purpose of incentives 
and the benchmarks for determining 
success at the outset. In Minnesota, 
the 2010 law creating a tax credit to 
encourage investments in technology 
start-ups included money to pay for an 
evaluation by January 2014.  The law 
indicates how the evaluation should 
determine whether the incentive has been 
effective. For example, the study must 
compare the economic results of the credit 
to alternative policies, such as cutting 
business taxes.
But in many cases, evaluators struggle 
to determine whether incentives are 
effective because they lack a clear, up-
to-date, and measurable goal. “What 
are they intended to accomplish?” asks 
Philip Durgin, executive director of 
Pennsylvania’s Legislative Budget and 
Finance Committee. “A lot of [incentives], 
they just give money out.”71
To say whether incentives are working 
well, states need to consider why they 
were enacted. If the goal is to help 
distressed areas, is the incentive designed 
to ensure that they benefit? If the goal is 
job creation, has the state put in place 
protections to make sure beneficiaries 
create new positions? Evaluations 
are better equipped to come to clear 
conclusions by asking such questions 
about the original intent.
The name of the Louisiana Quality Jobs 
program indicates its purpose: “The 
whole notion is creating quality jobs,” 
says Stephen Moret, secretary of Louisiana 
Economic Development.72 In evaluating 
the program in 2010, the agency 
identified ways in which it might not have 
been meeting that goal. For example, 
the jobs were required to include basic 
health insurance, but the rules governing 
eligibility allowed employers to delay 
the availability of insurance and provide 
subpar benefits. The agency updated the 
program’s rules to require companies to 
offer health insurance to new employees 
within 90 days and to create formal 
procedures for analyzing its value to make 
sure it was adequate. 73
In an evaluation of the Keystone 
Opportunity Zone program (KOZ) in 
Pennsylvania, the Legislative Budget 
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and Finance Committee relied on the 
legislative intent section of the act 
creating the program to determine that 
it was aimed at boosting employment 
and capital investment in the state. Yet 
recipients of KOZ were not required 
to create jobs or make investments to 
maintain eligibility. The committee 
recommended that only projects that 
generate these results qualify for KOZ.74
Sometimes the original goals of 
incentives are obsolete. In evaluating 
a tax incentive for beef processors, 
Washington State’s Joint Legislative Audit 
and Review Committee determined 
that the state had created the benefit to 
provide temporary relief during a ban 
on U.S. beef by Japan, South Korea, and 
Mexico after the discovery of mad cow 
disease on a Washington ranch in 2003. 
When it studied the tax deduction in 
2007, the JLARC concluded that the 
beef-processing industry was no longer 
suffering. Policy makers agreed, and the 
program ended that year.75
Even when an incentive’s purpose is 
not clearly established, some states 
have defined goals after the fact. When 
the North Carolina General Assembly 
commissioned a study to assess the 
effectiveness of the state’s tax incentives, 
policy leaders did just that. The 
legislature’s Joint Select Committee on 
Economic Development Incentives and 
legislative staff helped University of 
North Carolina evaluators identify three 
primary goals for the incentives: creating 
quality jobs, benefiting distressed areas, 
and making the state more economically 
competitive. Within each of those broad 
goals, lawmakers and the evaluators 
identified relevant measures. For quality 
job creation, they were interested not 
only in the number of jobs but also their 
wages, whether they were in industries 
the state was targeting, and whether the 
businesses were hiring North Carolina 
residents.76
When tax incentives do not meet their 
targets for statewide economic growth, 
there may be other goals the legislature 
considers. The Missouri auditor’s office 
concluded that a tax credit program 
designed to encourage processing of 
agricultural commodities would create 
few jobs and have only a minimal net 
effect on the state’s economy, while 
costing far more than the additional 
revenue generated. However, the agency 
noted that the program may have 
positive impacts in rural communities 
and, in doing so, improve quality of life 
there. The auditor recommended that 
lawmakers consider whether this was 
worth the cost of the incentives.77 
In many cases, states that find their 
tax incentives are not generating the 
expected return on investment choose 
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to alter them and not eliminate them. 
Effective evaluations often provide a 
blueprint for improvement.
In Minnesota, the legislative auditor’s 
office in 2008 made a variety of 
recommendations to correct flaws 
it identified in the Job Opportunity 
Building Zones program. It advised that 
JOBZ projects should go forward only 
with the approval of the state Department 
of Employment and Economic 
Development (before the change, local 
governments could approve projects). 
It recommended that before approval, 
companies should have to disclose 
competition with existing Minnesota 
businesses and demonstrate they would 
not expand or relocate without the 
incentives. It also said the agency should 
consider the costs and benefits of each 
project.78 The department made many of 
the recommended changes.79
Even when the goals of an incentive 
are clear, it still might be difficult for 
evaluators to draw conclusions and 
make recommendations. Governors 
and legislators often have staked 
out positions for or against tax 
incentives, so agency staff might not be 
comfortable passing judgment on them. 
The Nebraska Department of Revenue 
must offer recommendations in an 
annual report on tax expenditures, 
mAryLANd’S 
ENTErPrISE ZONE
states commonly use enterprise 
zones to try to revitalize 
economically distressed areas. they 
lower taxes and sometimes reduce 
regulations to create incentives for 
businesses to locate in specified 
neighborhoods.
in Maryland, there are 28 enterprise 
zones, from a 64-acre industrial 
park in rural garrett county 
to more than 21,000 acres of 
baltimore neighborhoods. Eligible 
businesses located in these zones 
can receive a one-time credit 
against state corporate income 
taxes of $1,000 per new employee 
($1,500 in the zones in baltimore 
city or Prince george’s county, 
which are considered “focus 
areas”). to encourage businesses 
to hire people in greatest need 
of employment, the credit is six 
times higher if the worker has very 
low family income, is receiving 
financial assistance from social 
service programs, or is homeless. 
companies also can receive local 
property tax credits.80 
Maryland does not disclose 
information on the recipients of 
enterprise zone credits, nor has 
the state published a rigorous 
evaluation of this program.
incEntivE ProfilE #4
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but in the latest edition, it simply 
repeats the same line 19 times: “The 
Nebraska Department of Revenue has 
no recommendations.”81 “We don’t want 
to be the ones to determine winners or 
losers,” says Kimberly K. Conroy, the 
state’s deputy tax commissioner.82
Sometimes lawmakers agree. Sen. Joe 
Bolkcom, co-chair of the Iowa Tax 
Expenditure Committee, says it is not 
the Department of Revenue’s job to tell 
lawmakers what they should do. “It’s 
too much to expect them to do that,” he 
says. Bolkcom’s view is that policy makers 
should draw their own conclusions 
based on the department’s research on 
the economic impact of incentives.83 The 
Iowa legislature’s new Tax Expenditure 
Committee is structured to do just that.
Ultimately, making policy choices about 
tax incentives is the purview of legislators 
and governors. Evaluations by auditors, 
economic development agencies, legislative 
committees, and outside consultants 
that provide clear statements of whether 
incentives are meeting their intended 
goals have proven a valuable resource to 
lawmakers in a number of states.
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Conclusion
Every year, states invest billions of 
taxpayer dollars in tax incentives 
designed to promote economic 
development, but few know whether 
they are getting a strong return on their 
investment. Some states do not carefully 
measure the economic impact of their 
incentives; others do not examine them 
at all. Some have conducted rigorous 
evaluations of individual tax incentives 
and others have systems for regularly 
reviewing all major tax incentives—
but no state has put the two together. 
As a result, when lawmakers consider 
whether to offer or continue such 
incentives, how much to spend, and who 
should get them, they often are relying 
on incomplete, conflicting, or unreliable 
information.
Closing this knowledge gap should be a 
top priority for policy makers, especially 
as states continue their efforts to emerge 
from the Great Recession. The good news 
is that a number are striving to do so, 
creating a blueprint for others to follow. 
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methodology
document search
For all states and the District of Columbia, 
we took two steps to identify documents 
related to state tax incentives for economic 
development. First, we conducted a 
comprehensive scan of the websites 
of relevant state agencies, including 
economic development, treasurer, revenue, 
finance, auditor, budget, comptroller/
controller, legislative auditor, legislative 
research services, film offices, and relevant 
commissions or task forces. This involved a 
manual scan of each site and a search using 
a customized search engine. Extensive 
information on each document was entered 
into a database. For each state, the search 
was performed a second time by a different 
analyst to help ensure quality control.
Next, we supplemented the Internet search 
by interviewing officials in economic 
development agencies, executive fiscal 
agencies, and legislative offices in all 50 
states and the District of Columbia. We 
conducted more than 175 interviews. The 
officials confirmed the documents we had 
collected and, in some cases, provided 
documents not available on state websites.
By casting this wide net, we collected 
and assessed nearly 600 documents. We 
narrowed this list to 293 documents by 
excluding those that were published before 
2007, were not published or sponsored 
by a state agency or legislative committee, 
lacked data or analysis on the costs or 
benefits of current tax incentives for 
economic development, or were excerpts 
from other documents. We also included 
documents that described the state’s 
policies for evaluating tax incentives. 
When documents had multiple editions, 
we kept the most recent edition unless 
older versions were of higher quality 
based on our assessment. A state-by-state 
breakdown of these documents is available 
on page 34. (The number of evaluations in 
a state does not necessarily correspond to 
their quality. In addition, in some states, a 
single document may evaluate multiple tax 
incentives.)
Next, we reviewed each of the 293 
documents to determine which met 
our definition of an evaluation. These 
documents had to 1) attempt to determine 
the effectiveness of an incentive rather than 
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just report numbers, and 2) consider the 
overall economic impact of the incentive, 
rather than just the results of a specific 
project or business receiving an incentive. 
Eighty-two documents met these criteria.
criteria for assessment
Scope. Based on the evaluations and 
interviews with state officials, we 
established the following criteria for 
assessing the scope of evaluations:
1. Including all major tax incentives. 
States could count as evaluating “all 
major tax incentives” even if they had 
not evaluated every one, so long as their 
decisions were based on reasonable 
criteria, such as which incentives cost 
the most and which incentives are open 
to new applicants. States could also 
receive credit if they were part of the way 
through a defined schedule to evaluate 
all major incentives.
2. Informing policy choices. To meet 
this criterion, the states had to include 
all incentives and, at a minimum, hold 
regular legislative hearings as part of the 
evaluation process.
Quality. We established the following 
criteria for assessing the quality of states’ 
evaluations:
1. Measuring economic impact. When 
determining whether an evaluation 
thoroughly measured economic impact, 
we focused on whether it isolated the 
impact of the tax incentive from other 
factors that influence business decisions, 
rather than assume the economic impact 
resulted from the incentive alone. 
Evaluations could achieve this in several 
ways, including 1) statistical analysis 
making comparisons between states or 
parts of the state; 2) surveys of recipients 
of the incentive; 3) simulations of the 
potential impact using existing literature 
or other analysis; or 4) tests of how 
sensitive estimates are to a range of 
assumptions.
Many studies that isolated the impact of 
the incentives themselves (versus other 
factors) addressed other key questions 
regarding economic impact, such as 
whether the tax incentive benefited some 
businesses at the expense of others, 
whether the benefits flowed across state 
borders, the timing of the costs and 
benefits, the economic impact of budget 
trade-offs, and indirect impacts.
2. Drawing clear conclusions. We 
looked for whether the evaluation 
concluded explicitly, based on good 
analysis, whether the incentive was 
meeting the state’s goals. We also 
looked for whether the evaluation made 
recommendations for improving the 
program.
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ratings
There are three rating categories: 
leading the way, mixed results, and 
trailing behind. States received a rating 
for scope, a rating for quality, and an 
overall rating. 
Scope: 
Leading the way: The state informed 
policy choices with reviews of all major 
tax incentives.
Mixed results: The state reviewed all 
major tax incentives, but fell short in 
using the data to inform policy choices.
Trailing behind: The state did not review 
all major tax incentives, nor did it use 
data to inform policy choices.
Quality: 
Leading the way: The state’s best 
evaluation measured economic impact 
and drew clear conclusions.
Mixed results: The state’s best evaluation 
measured economic impact OR drew 
clear conclusions, but not both.
Trailing behind: Either the state did not 
conduct any evaluations or the state’s best 
evaluation did not meet either criterion.
Inform
policy
choices
Include
all tax
incentivesSCOPE RATING
Trailing behind
Mixed results
Leading the way
The two ratings are combined for an overall rating. A state that is leading the way on 
either scope or quality is leading the way overall. States that met at least one of the four 
criteria but are not leading the way in scope or quality have mixed results overall. States 
that did not meet any of the four criteria are trailing behind. 
Overall Rating
Measure
economic
impact
Draw
clear
conclusionsQUALITY RATING
Trailing behind
Mixed results
Mixed results
Leading the way
Rating the states
Rating the
scope of evaluation
Rating the
quality of evaluation
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Overall:
Those two ratings are combined for an 
overall rating. A state that is leading the 
way on either scope or quality is leading 
the way overall. States that met at least one 
of the four criteria, but are not leading the 
way in either scope or quality, have mixed 
results overall. States that did not meet any 
of the four criteria are trailing behind. 
Leading the way: A state can lead 
the way in the scope of evaluation (by 
informing policy choices and including 
all major tax incentives) or in the 
quality of evaluation (by measuring 
economic impact and drawing clear 
conclusions).
Mixed results: A state with mixed results 
has only partially met the criteria for 
scope and/or quality of evaluation.
Trailing behind: A state is trailing behind 
if it has not met any of the criteria for 
scope or quality of evaluation.
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This study considered the scope of tax 
incentive evaluations from 2007 to 
2011, assessing states on whether they 
1) evaluated all major tax incentives 
and 2) sought to ensure that policy-
making deliberations were informed by 
the results. Listed below is a document 
from every state that met one or both of 
these criteria. For states that evaluated all 
major tax incentives in a single document, 
that document is listed; for states that 
conducted a series of reviews over 
time, the list includes their most recent 
evaluations or documents describing their 
process.
To assess quality, this study assessed 
the states’ single best evaluation of a tax 
incentive from 2007 through 2011. Listed 
below is the best evaluation in every state 
that met at least one of the two criteria 
for quality: thoroughly measuring the 
economic impact of tax incentives and 
drawing clear conclusions. Although some 
states have produced multiple evaluations 
that met one or both criteria for quality, 
only the single best evaluation—the one 
used to assess the state—is listed. 
arizona
Scope: Rating was based on the state’s 
ongoing review process. For more 
information, see: http://azmemory.lib.
az.us/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/
statepubs&CISOPTR=184&REC=3
arkansas
Scope and quality: Arkansas 
Legislative Joint Auditing Committee, 
“Performance Audit - Selected 
Programs of the Consolidated 
Incentive Act of 2003,” October 
2009, http://arklegaudit.gov/showfile.
php?t=webaudit&fid=PSPE02908.
California
Scope: State of California Franchise 
Tax Board, “California Income Tax 
Expenditures Compendium of Individual 
Provisions,” December 2011, https://www.
ftb.ca.gov/aboutftb/Tax_Expenditure_
Report_2011.pdf.
note: all links were active as of March 26, 2012.
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Connecticut
Scope and quality: Connecticut 
Department of Economic and Community 
Development, “An Assessment of 
Connecticut’s Tax Credit and Abatement 
Programs,” December 2010, http://www.
ct.gov/ecd/lib/ecd/decd_sb_501_sec_27_
report_12-30-2010_final.pdf.
delaware
Scope: Delaware Department of Finance, 
“2011 Tax Preference Report,” December 
2011, http://finance.delaware.gov/
publications/tax_prefer/report_11.pdf.
iowa
Scope: Rating was based on the state’s 
ongoing review process. For more 
information, see: https://www.legis.iowa.
gov/DOCS/LSA/IntComHand/2012/
IHMJD000.PDF.
Quality: Iowa Department of Revenue, 
“Iowa’s Research Activities Tax Credit Tax 
Credits Program Evaluation Study,” January 
2008, http://www.iowa.gov/tax/taxlaw/
IDRTaxCreditEvalJan2008.pdf.
Kansas
Scope and quality: Kansas Legislative 
Division of Post Audit, “Kansas Tax 
Revenues, Part I: Reviewing Tax Credits,” 
February 2010, http://www.kslpa.org/docs/
reports/10pa03-1a.pdf.
Kentucky
Quality: University of Kentucky Center 
for Business and Economic Research 
(for Kentucky Cabinet for Economic 
Development), “An Examination of 
Incentives to Attract and Retain Businesses 
in Kentucky,” January 2007, http://cber.
uky.edu/Downloads/BusinessIncentives_
Final%20Report_01182007.pdf.
louisiana
Quality: Louisiana Economic Development, 
“Enterprise Zone Program 2009 Annual 
Report,” March 2010, http://www.
louisianaeconomicdevelopment.com/
downloads/2009_Annual_Report_
Enterprise_Zone.pdf.
massachusetts
Quality: Massachusetts Department of 
Revenue, “A Report on the Massachusetts 
Film Industry Tax Incentives,” November 
2011, http://www.mass.gov/dor/docs/dor/
news/2011filmincentivereport.pdf.
michigan
Quality: Michigan Senate Fiscal Agency, 
“Film Incentives In Michigan,” September 
2010, http://www.senate.michigan.gov/
sfa/Publications/Issues/FilmIncentives/
FilmIncentives.pdf.
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minnesota
Quality: Minnesota Office of the Legislative 
Auditor, “Evaluation Report: JOBZ 
Program,” February 2008, http://www.
auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/jobz.pdf.
missouri
Scope: Missouri Tax Credit Review 
Commission, “Report of the Missouri 
Tax Credit Review Commission,” 
November 2010, http://tcrc.mo.gov/pdf/
TCRCFinalReport113010.pdf.
Quality: Missouri State Auditor, “Analysis of 
the New Generation Cooperative Incentive 
Tax Credit Program,” February 2007, http://
www.auditor.mo.gov/press/2007-06.pdf.
nebraska
Scope and quality: Nebraska Department 
of Revenue, “Nebraska Tax Incentives: 2010 
Annual Report to the Nebraska Legislature,” 
July 2011, http://www.revenue.ne.gov/
incentiv/annrep/10an_rep/2010_incentives_
annual_report_FINAL.pdf.
new Jersey
Quality: Delta Development Group, Inc. 
and HR&R Advisors, Inc. (for New Jersey 
Economic Development Authority), “New 
Jersey Urban Enterprise Zone Program 
Assessment,” February 2011, http://www.
state.nj.us/treasury/pdf/NJ%20Urban%20
Enterprise%20Zone%20Program.pdf.
new mexico
Quality: New Mexico State University 
Arrowhead Center (for New Mexico 
Legislative Finance Committee), “The Film 
Industry in New Mexico and The Provision 
of Tax Incentives,” August 2008, http://
www.nmlegis.gov/lcs/lfc/lfcdocs/film%20
credit%20study%20TP&JP_08.pdf.
new york
Quality: Office of the New York State 
Comptroller, “Annual Performance 
Report on New York State’s Industrial 
Development Agencies,” July 2011, http://
www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/
idaperformance2011.pdf.
north Carolina
Scope and quality: University of North 
Carolina Center for Competitive Economies 
(for the North Carolina General Assembly 
Joint Select Committee on Economic 
Development Incentives), “An Evaluation 
of North Carolina’s Economic Development 
Incentive Programs: Final Report,” July 
2009, http://www.ncleg.net/documentsites/
committees/JSCEDI/UNC%20C3E%20
2009%20final%20report%20to%20
NCGA%20Joint%20Select%20
Committee%20on%20Economic%20
Development%20Incentives.pdf.
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ohio
Scope and quality: Ohio Department 
of Development, “Ohio Economic 
Development Incentive Study,” May 
2009, http://www.development.ohio.gov/
DepartmentReports/Reports/IncentiveStudy.
pdf.
oregon
Scope: Rating was based on the state’s 
ongoing review process. For more 
information, see: http://www.leg.state.or.us/
committees/commPages/2011i_jtax.html.
Quality: Industrial Economics, Inc. (for the 
Oregon Department of Energy), “Financial 
and Economic Impact of the Oregon 
Business Energy Tax Credit: An Analysis of 
Representative Projects Certified During the 
Period 2002 to 2009,” May 2011, http://
www.oregon.gov/ENERGY/docs/reports/
BETC_Analysis_IEc_Report_to_ODOE_
May2011.pdf.
Pennsylvania
Scope: Legislative Budget and Finance 
Committee of the Pennsylvania General 
Assembly, “Pennsylvania’s Tax Credit 
Programs,” June 2010, http://lbfc.legis.state.
pa.us/reports/2010/49.PDF.
Quality: Pennsylvania Legislative Budget 
and Finance Committee, “An Evaluation 
of the Keystone Opportunity Zone (KOZ) 
Program,” June 2009, http://lbfc.legis.state.
pa.us/reports/2009/36.PDF.
texas
Scope and quality: Texas Comptroller of 
Public Accounts, “An Analysis of Texas 
Economic Development Incentives 2010,” 
April 2011, http://www.texasahead.org/
reports/incentives/pdf/EconomicIncentives.
pdf.
virginia
Scope and quality: Virginia Joint 
Legislative Audit and Review Commission, 
“Review of the Effectiveness of Virginia Tax 
Preferences,” November 2011, http://jlarc.
virginia.gov/meetings/November11/TaxPref.
pdf.
Washington
Scope: Rating was based on the state’s 
ongoing review process. For more 
information, see: http://www.citizentaxpref.
wa.gov/.
Quality: Washington Joint Legislative Audit 
and Review Committee, “Tax Preference 
Performance Review: Beef Processors,” 
March 2007, http://www.leg.wa.gov/
JLARC/AuditAndStudyReports/2007/
Documents/07-7.pdf.
Wisconsin
Quality: Wisconsin Department of 
Commerce, “Cost Benefit Analysis of 
Wisconsin Film Tax Credit Program,” 
March 2009, http://commerce.wi.gov/
COM/docs/COM-Film-Analysis-
Presentation.pdf.
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although this report focuses on state evaluations of tax incentives, states produce 
other reports about tax incentives that play an important role in the policy process. 
when these documents include evaluation, they are considered in our assessment. 
Examples of these other types of documents include:
Tax expenditure reports or budgets: these documents detail the fiscal 
impact of tax incentives. they vary in scope and quality, but the best 
ones—such as those produced by the district of columbia, Minnesota, and 
oregon—include critical information such as the fiscal cost, who benefits, and 
the purpose.
Fiscal notes: these are official estimates of the cost of new legislation. 
Estimating the cost of tax incentives can be challenging, but in the current 
fiscal climate, it is more important than ever to get it right.
Audit reports: audits that include evaluation of the effectiveness of tax 
incentives are included in our assessment. others focus on critical issues 
concerning the administration of tax incentives, such as whether recipients 
of incentives and state agencies that offer incentives are complying with 
eligibility rules.
reports on economic development program activity: state legislatures 
often require a performance report on a specific tax incentive program. these 
are typically prepared by the implementing agency and include information 
on the businesses receiving the incentive and, in some cases, data on jobs 
as reported by businesses. these reports provide useful information for the 
legislature, but the jobs data reported often are not audited or reviewed 
for accuracy, and such documents generally do not address whether the 
incentive directly led to the creation of the jobs.
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Arizona: p.3, 10, 12, 16, 17, 32, 34, 38
Arkansas: p.17, 22, 32, 34, 38
California: p.7, 8, 17, 32, 34, 38
Colorado: p.32, 34
Connecticut: p.3, 4, 17, 18, 23, 25, 26, 32, 34, 39
District of Columbia: p.7, 32, 33, 34
Delaware: p.6, 17, 32, 34, 39
Florida: p.32, 34  
Georgia: p.7, 32, 34
Hawaii: p.21, 32, 34
Idaho: p.7, 32, 34
Illinois: p.7, 32, 34  
Indiana: p.7, 32, 34  
Iowa: p.3, 12, 16, 17, 19, 24, 30, 32, 34, 39 
Kansas: p.22, 32, 34, 39
Kentucky: p.32, 34, 39  
Louisiana: p.3, 4, 7, 8, 22, 27, 32, 34, 39 
Maine: p.7, 32, 34  
Maryland: p.7, 29, 32, 34
Massachusetts: p.7, 24, 25, 32, 34, 39 
Michigan: p.7, 32, 34, 39  
Minnesota: p.3, 7, 10, 21, 27, 29, 32, 34, 40, 42
Mississippi: p.7, 32, 34
Missouri: p.18, 22, 23, 26, 28, 32, 34, 40
Montana: p.7, 32, 34  
Nebraska: p.17, 29, 30, 32, 34, 40
Nevada: p.7, 32, 34
New Hampshire: p.7, 32, 34  
New Jersey: p.23, 26, 32, 34, 40 
New Mexico: p.5, 32, 34, 40 
New York: p.12, 32, 34, 40
North Carolina: p.24, 28, 32, 34, 40 
North Dakota: p.32, 34  
Ohio: p.8, 18, 32, 34, 41 
Oklahoma: p.8, 17, 32, 34
Oregon: p.1, 4, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 25, 26, 32, 34, 41, 42
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Rhode Island: p.32, 34  
South Carolina: p.32, 34
South Dakota: p.7, 32, 34  
Tennessee: p.7, 32, 34  
Texas: p.22, 32, 34, 41  
Utah: p.7, 32, 34
Vermont: p.7, 32, 34  
Virginia: p.32, 34, 41  
Washington: p.3, 4, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 28, 32, 34, 41 
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Wisconsin: p.3, 8, 23, 32, 34, 41 
Wyoming: p.7, 32, 34  
indEx of rEfErEnCES to StatES
the Pew center on the states is a division of 
the Pew charitable trusts that identifies and 
advances effective solutions to critical issues 
facing states. Pew is a nonprofit organization 
that applies a rigorous, analytical approach to 
improve public policy, inform the public, and 
stimulate civic life. 
www.pewstates.org
STAY ConneCTeD  pewstates.org
twitter.com/pewstates            youtube.com/pew          facebook.com/pewtrusts
pewstates.org/newsletter
